Shouldn't Friedman know better? Disappointingly, he is perpetuating some myths in today's column with claims that the Iraq War had "strategic benefits" regarding:
1) "the defeat of Al Qaeda [in Iraq], which diminished its capacity to attack us." --Certainly not. Al Qaeda had no or minimal presence in Iraq before the war. Hussein viewed it as a threat to his regime. Since Al Qaeda's presence was minimal to non-existent in Iraq before the war, defeating it there should be presented, at most, as a zero-gain/loss event. Moreover, any claim that the Iraq War sucked in Al Qaeda so the US could defeat it militarily needs to be counterbalanced by the obvious fact that America's ability to focus on Al Qaeda in other theaters would have been much stronger without the distraction of a nation-building occupation.
2) "the intimidation of Libya, which prompted its dictator to surrender his nuclear program." --Perhaps, but this argument is missing an important context. As Jacques Hymans (a nuclear proliferation experts) told me, Libyan scientists had no idea what they were doing. Reportedly, many of the tools they needed to really start their program were still in boxes. What the Iraq invasion did was give Libya an opportunity to come clean and rejoin the world community on good terms, something it had wanted for quite a while. Much of what changed with the Iraq invasion was that the Bush administration changed its tune and became willing to give Libya easier terms.
3) By saying there were "strategic benefits" Friedman is missing the main problem with the overall strategy, which is that the invasion greatly improved Iran's strategic position by removing a Sunni dictator and handing most of the ruling authority in Iraq to Shias, who are less likely to view Shia Iran as a natural enemy.
Link to Friedman column: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/opinion/friedman-the-end-for-now.html?ref=global-home
Wednesday, December 21, 2011
Monday, December 19, 2011
Predictions about North Korea following death of Kim Jong-il.
Predictions on North Korea:
1) There is little chance of a popular uprising against the Kims. If Kim Jong-un loses power it will almost certainly happen at the hand of a general.
2) China will work very hard to ensure there is either no coup, or that the generals responsible for it are committed to a future in which NK remains allied with China and at odds with SK.
3) It will be very hard for the America and its friends to leverage the same kind of pressure that China can bring to bear against NK. We simply don't have the extensive ties to NK that China does. This suggests that the most likely outcome will be a NK ruled by Kim Jong-un or generals with close ties to China.
4) It is extremely unlikely that Kim Jong-un will be able to enact meaningful social, political, and economic reforms. He inherited all of his legitimacy from his father and grandfather. Any reform he implements implicitly questions their policies--i.e., the very foundation of his own legitimacy.
5) In the event of the removal of Kim Jong-un, NK will have its first real opportunity to enact reforms. Expect tepid economic reforms along the lines China first tried following the death of Mao, and minimal social and political reforms. NK has been unable to reform because of the family lineage and legitimacy question, and because reform increased the likelihood that average Koreans would realize that an incredible foundation of lies upheld the Kim clan.
6) A major war between the two Koreas (and involving the US) is an unlikely outcome. However, hawks within NK have incentive to instigate small scale military actions to keep relations tense and therefore bolster the argument that these generals are important.
7) Of the above, the least certain is China'a ability to shape NK outcomes. North Koreans are very serious about their independence, and would accept with only the greatest difficulty the idea of being more dependent on China. Expect NK to lean to China strongly, but also make appeasement moves toward Japan and the US to diminish Chinese influence. Given that the generals in NK know they will end up being hot dog vendors in the event of a reunified Korea, they will be disinclined to reach out to SK. The Korean nation is likely to remain divided for quite some time.
Let's hope the last point is wrong. How prescient will this post prove over the next 1-10 years?
1) There is little chance of a popular uprising against the Kims. If Kim Jong-un loses power it will almost certainly happen at the hand of a general.
2) China will work very hard to ensure there is either no coup, or that the generals responsible for it are committed to a future in which NK remains allied with China and at odds with SK.
3) It will be very hard for the America and its friends to leverage the same kind of pressure that China can bring to bear against NK. We simply don't have the extensive ties to NK that China does. This suggests that the most likely outcome will be a NK ruled by Kim Jong-un or generals with close ties to China.
4) It is extremely unlikely that Kim Jong-un will be able to enact meaningful social, political, and economic reforms. He inherited all of his legitimacy from his father and grandfather. Any reform he implements implicitly questions their policies--i.e., the very foundation of his own legitimacy.
5) In the event of the removal of Kim Jong-un, NK will have its first real opportunity to enact reforms. Expect tepid economic reforms along the lines China first tried following the death of Mao, and minimal social and political reforms. NK has been unable to reform because of the family lineage and legitimacy question, and because reform increased the likelihood that average Koreans would realize that an incredible foundation of lies upheld the Kim clan.
6) A major war between the two Koreas (and involving the US) is an unlikely outcome. However, hawks within NK have incentive to instigate small scale military actions to keep relations tense and therefore bolster the argument that these generals are important.
7) Of the above, the least certain is China'a ability to shape NK outcomes. North Koreans are very serious about their independence, and would accept with only the greatest difficulty the idea of being more dependent on China. Expect NK to lean to China strongly, but also make appeasement moves toward Japan and the US to diminish Chinese influence. Given that the generals in NK know they will end up being hot dog vendors in the event of a reunified Korea, they will be disinclined to reach out to SK. The Korean nation is likely to remain divided for quite some time.
Let's hope the last point is wrong. How prescient will this post prove over the next 1-10 years?
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